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Robert E. Looney 
The Impact of Arms Imports 
and Economic Environments 
on Third World Debt 
As is well known, the recycling of the flood of petro dollars that 
followed the 1973 increases in oil prices resulted in large amounts of 
money being lent by Western banking syndicates to the Third World in 
anticipation of relatively high rates of return. In retrospect, it is clear 
that while some of the money was used to finance development 
projects that presumably would generate sufficient income to repay the 
loans, much of it was used for increased consumption and capital 
flight. There is also the suspicion among many observers that a 
considerable amount of this funding was used to finance arms imports 
(Tullberg, 1986: 261). 
Support for this position is largely based on two similar trends that 
developed in the 1970s and early 1980s. More specifically, government 
and government-guaranteed debts of the nonoil developing countries 
grew from U.S. $130 billion in 1973 to U.S. $729 billion in 1984, 
accounting for 85 percent of the external debts of developing 
countries. The value of arms transferred to nonoil developing countries 
more than doubled in real terms between 1972 and 1982; the share of 
total world arms transfers increased from 31 percent to 41 percent in 
the same period (Tullberg, 1986: 262). Analysts stressing the link 
between arms imports and Third World debt note that the existence of 
these two patterns are more than just a coincidence. 
Further substantiation of the link between arms transfers and 
public external debt is found in the fact that arms purchases grew in 
importance during the 1970s as the two major arms donors (the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union) switched their policy from one of gifts to one of 
sales (Tullberg, 1986: 262). 
Despite the rather logical assertion that considerable amounts of 
Third World indebtedness have stemmed from arms imports,· little 
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empirical testing of the link between arms imports and the Third 
World's debt has been done. Nor has there been any empirical work to 
determine whether the link between arms imports and external debt is 
universal throughout the Third World or is confined to a smaller 
subgroup of Third World countries. The purpose of this chapter is to 
develop a simple model of Third World debt and use it to examine the 
issues raised above. 
MEffiODOLOGY 
Brzoska (1983) provides what is to date the only attempt to 
estimate the extent to which arms imports have been responsible for 
the acceleration in Third World debt (see related works: Terhal, 1982; 
Alexander, et al., 1981). His estimates· are, however, indirect, using an 
opportunity cost assessment of the impact on Third World debt created 
by arms imports. Brzoska estimates that had the Third World. countries 
that were importing debt capital in 1979 not also imported arms in 
1979, the net transfers of debt could have been anywhere from 20 to 
30 percent lower. The opportunity cost burden of accumulated debt 
over time is estimated by Brzoska to be about 20 percent of the total 
Third World debt for 1979. For 1979, the interest in amortization of the 
old debt added up to more than twice the cost of new-weapons 
imports for credit-importing countries, according to Brzoska's estimates. 
Weapons purchased with scarce foreign exchange have an obvious 
allocation cost in terms of reduced resources available for the import of 
intermediate imports and investment goods essential for self-sustaining 
growth. 
Clearly, however, whether or not Third World countries have 
reduced their borrowing proportionally to the amount spent on arms 
imports is quite conjectural. In fact, Sjaastad (1983) has convincingly 
shown that, given the generally negative rates of interest prevailing 
throughout most of the 1970s, Third World countries had an incentive 
to borrow as much as banks were willing to lend. · 
The great build-up of private international lending that occurred 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, which was closely related to (if not a 
cons~quence oO the oil price increases, produced a virtual explosion 
of liquidity in the international commercial banks. Perhaps because of 
unanticipated inOation, and in part due to the OPEC surpluses 
following the oil price increases of 1973 and 1974, real rates of interest 
on dollar-dominated external debt were very low. In fact, such rates 
were frequently negative, giving the developing countries a rather 
strong incentive to incur that debt. When real rates of interest are 
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negative (and expected to remain so), it is clearly impossible to have 
"too much" external debt. 
While Brzoska has made a convincing argument as to the potential 
reduction in Third World debt that a moratorium on arms transfers may 
have produced, it is by no means obvious that Third World debt would 
have been lower in the absence of arms imports. 
What follows is an attempt to extend Brzoska' s analysis by 
examining the more direct linkages between arms imports and Third 
World debt. For this purpose, a formal model indicating the 
equilibrium level of external debt has been developed. I This 
equilibrium level is solved for by a "reduced form" equation derived 
from a set of relationships that account for the major supply-and-
demand determinants of external debt. 
MODEL FORMUIATION 
The sample used in this analysis consisted of seventy-seven developing 
countries for which the requisite data could be obtained. 2 External debt 
is defined as public external debt owed to nonresidents, repayable in 
foreign currency and having a maturity of more than one year. 
In selecting variables responsible for the volume of public external 
debt accumulated by 1982, it is reasonable to assume that a country's 
size will have a direct relationship to the amount of external 
indebtedness and the individual country's capacity to service this debt. 
Clearly, a large country (as measured by GNP) will have more financial 
and commercial relations with the rest of the world economy and 
therefore will be more likely to accumulate a larger debt volume than a 
smaller country. At the same time, due to the diversity of output and 
the resource base, the debt-servicing capacity of a large country is apt 
to be greater than that of a small country (and, consequently, a larger 
external debt can be accumulated). In general, we postulate that the 
larger the LDC Oess developed country) economy, as measured by a 
country's GNP, the greater its demand for external indebtedness. 
A country's external debt should, in general, be related to its 
general volume of merchandise imports. For LDCs, the volume of 
merchandise imports often tends to have a direct relationship to the 
country's GNP, thus providing an additional source of demand for debt. 
Since in a growing economy a share of imports will have to be 
financed, a country's indebtedness will be higher as total imports 
increase. 
An LDC with a greater export volume will be able to service a 
larger amount of foreign debt. As is well known, export volume is 
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often used by lending institutiop.s as a key indicator of debt-service 
capacity. For practical purposes, it is safe to assume that the 
willingness of lenders to supply debt varies directly with a country's 
exports. This relationship is particularly important as it relates directly 
to the country's export financing. For most developing countries, 
export financing is done in foreign currency since most of the exports 
are denominated in foreign currency as well. In short, we would 
expect a positive relationship between country debt and the volume of 
merchandise exports. 
An LDC's overall current account deficit (or surplus) provides the 
most direct impact on external debt, since obviously the size of the 
deficit is made possible by external financing. Clearly, the larger the 
current account deficit, the larger the overall external public debt. 
International reserve holdings may be another important factor that 
affects the volume of a country's external debt. Here the relationship is 
likely to be more complex. Logically, as a country's reserves increase, 
its ability to service a growing external debt and, hence, its 
creditworthiness should also increase. On the other hand, everything 
else being equal, one might expect that the larger a country's external 
revenues, the less pressing the need for additional debt to finance 
imports. Therefore, possession of a larger volume of international 
reserves may result in larger or smaller volumes of external debt. 
Three types of governmental expendituresL-arms imports, health, 
and education-are introduced as independent variables in the 
demand for external debt. For political or social reasons, these 
expenditures have a high import component and therefore may be 
major elements in accounting for the volume of external public debt 
over and above the other demand variables noted above. 
Clearly, because of the high correlation between the independent 
variables defined above, it is not possible to determine through 
regression analysis the percent of LDC public external debt stemming 
from military expenditures. Given this constraint, the analysis below 
attempts to answer the question of whether military expenditures (after 
controlling for GDP, imports, and reserves) have significantly 
contributed to LDC external indebtedness and, if so, what type of 
environments have been most conducive to external borrowing for the 
purpose of increasing military expenditures. 
The next step in the analysis is to isolate the main supply-and-
demand influences on Third World indebtedness by deriving a reduced 
form equation that is capable of measuring the influence of all 
independent variables simultaneously. 
In the specification here, the GNP was assumed to be the most 
significant factor affecting the demand for external debt (see Heller and 
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Frankel, 1982). This was followed in relative importance by total 
imports (TI); the current account balance (BI); and the individual 
public sector expenditures, comprised of arms imports (AI), health 
(SH), and education (SE). 
The main variables assumed to affect the supply of external loans 
were those reflective of the borrowing country's ability to service debt. 
Gross International Reserves (GIRB) and exports (TE) were assumed to 
be the indicators most international lenders considered as indicative of 
a country's borrowing capacity. Notationally: 
a) Total debt (PDB) supply = fl (reserves, exports), and 
b) Total debt (PDB) demand = f2 (GNP, imports, current 
account balance, military expenditures, education 
expenditures, and health expenditures) 
c) Total debt (supply)= total debt (demand) 
Dividing equations (a) and (b) by the equilibrium level of total 
debt as specified in equation (c), we obtain equation (d): 
d) fl/(total debt) = f2/(total debt), or, expressing equation (d) 
implicitly, we can write: 
e) xl (fl/total debt, f2/total debt), = 0, or 
f) x2 (total debt, GDP, imports, reserves, military expenditures, 
educational expenditures, health expenditures, exports, 
current account balance, and imports) = 0, or 
g) PDB = f3 {GNP(+), TI(+), GIRB (-),AI(+), SE(+), SH(+), 
TE(+), BI(+)]= 0 
This reduced form equation (g) with expected signs was used for 
the estimations performed below. 
FINDINGS 
Total Sample 
As expected, the regression results4 indicate (see Table 4.1) the 
relative importance of gross national product and international reserves 
in affecting the level of Third World debt. These two variables have the 
expected sign and account for slightly over 70 percent of the observed 
level of debt (Equation 1, Table 4.1). The negative sign on international 
reserves (GIRB) indicates that countries with high reserves tend to 
receive less external funds. This suggests that a country in a relatively 
comfortable financial position, as evidenced by high reserve holdings, 
is less likely to incur external indebtedness. 
On the other hand, imports CTI), the balance of payments deficit 
90 Robert E. Looney 
(BI), and arms imports CAD, all appear to have had an insignificant 
impact on Third World debt 
Analysis of Subgroupin~ 
To test the general validity of this conclusion, our sample of 
developing countries was divided into two subgroupings through 
factor and.discriminant analysis. 
Several studies (Frederiksen and Looney, 1982, 1983, 1985a, 1985b; 
Looney and Frederiksen, 1986a) have indicated that developing 
countries lack homogeneity with regard to resource availabilities 
Oargely savings and foreign exchange). In tum, the relative degree of 
resource availability affects the impact that defense expenditures have 
on economic growth-positive in countries with relatively abundant 
resources, and negative in those countries-experiencing relative scarcities. 
In light of the above-cited results, it makes sense to split the 
sample of developing countries into groups based on some measure of 
resource constraint. Presumably, those countries that have either more 
domestic resources (savings and investment) or more access to foreign 
capital (everything else being equal, such as gross national product) 
will be able to support a higher level of defense expenditures. On the 
other hand, those countries having a lower level of domestic resources 
or less access to international capital will not have as high a level of 
defense expenditures (everything else being equal). 
Given the necessity to separate our sample of countries into 
subgroupings, the question remains as to the best operational method 
to accomplish this task. Frederiksen's and Looney's analysis, 
summarized above, indicated that a fruitful method of dividing 
countries for an analysis of arms imports is on the basis of their relative 
resource constraints. 
A number of variables reflect relative resource scarcity in 
developing countries. These include measures of savings, investment, 
capital flow, debt servicing, exports, and imports. The statistical 
problem is that many of these measures are highly correlated with 
each other and, as such, are redundant in providing information as to 
resource scarcity. 
One solution to this problem is to simply pick several variables--
savings and exports, for example-and create two groups of countries: 
one with high savings and exports (an unconstrained group) and the 
other with low savings and exports (the relatively constrained group). 
This procedure suffers from the fact that the selection of variables is 
somewhat arbitrary. More importantly, since some countries are likely 
to have low rates of savings and high exports, or vice versa, they thus 
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In order to make the following analysis as objective as possible, a 
large number of variables reflective of resource scarcity was selected as 
an initial data set. These independent variables were then factor-
analyzed. The advantage of factor analysis is that by determining the 
common variance among the independent variables, the researcher can 
objectively reduce the number of variables to be retained for further 
analysis. 
From a total of thirty-four variables, the factor analysis5 produced 
seven major independent measures of resource scarcity. The variables 
most representative of each trend were: 
1. Gross Inflow of Public Loans/Exports in 1982 
2. Total Public External Debt in 1982 · 
3. Gross International Reserves in 1982 
4. Public External Debt as a percent of GDP in 1982 
5. Growth in Imports between 1970 and 1982 
6. External Debt Service as a percent of GDP in 1982 
7. Public External Debt as a percent of GDP in 1970 
The next step in creating subgroupings of countries based on their 
relative resource scarcity was to utilize the seven variables above as 
discriminating variables in a discriminant analysis.6 Using these 
variables, the discriminant analysis split the countries into two 
groupings based on their relative attainment of each of the seven 
variables (i.e., the countries were profiled into two composite groups 
[Table 4.2] based on their relative resource abundance as reflected in 
the seven measures of scarcity). 
In general, Group I countries seem to be the poorer, less econom-
ically dynamic nations, this group being heavily weighted with African 
and poorer Latin American countries. The Group II countries consist of 
several major oil exporters and several of the more dynamic newly 
industrialized nations, such as Mexico, Greece, India, Korea, Spain, 
Algeria, and Malaysia. 
Further insight into the two groups can be gained by examining 
the means of the variables used in the discriminant analysis (Table 4.3): 
1. Group I countries resorted to a much higher (3,6 times) inflow 
of external public loans in 1982 relative to their exports that 
year. 
2. On the other hand, the overall level of total public external debt 
in 1982 averaged nearly 4.5 times as much for Group II 
countries than for Group I countries. 
3. The level of international reserves is also much higher for Group 
TT ,..-. .... - ... :L1',,.. .... "'31.,. .. 1..,,. t-.a .... ,.; ...... L1',,.. ,.l('O _.. .... ,..l,. ,.,,.. .i.. ...... .............. -,..,. ..... C-- r--··-
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4. With regard to shares of debt in gross domestic product, 
however, Group I countries have much higher levels of 
attainment, averaging nearly twice as much as Group II 
countries in both 1970 and 1982. The debt-service ratio to 
exports is correspondingly higher for Group I countries. 
5. The rate of growth of imports was nearly ten times higher over 
the 1970-1982 period for Group II countries. 
In terms of profiles, therefore, Group II countries are considerably 
larger, more affluent, and less reliant on external debt as a percentage 
of gross domestic product. They tend to spend relatively large amounts 
on military activities, but not necessarily significantly greater 
percentages of their overall budgets. 
Given the contrasting economic environments between the two 
types of countries, it is logical to e~pect that the determinants of 
external debt varied considerably between the groups. 
When analyzed separately, the constrained and unconstrained 
countries produce sharply differing pictures of the contributions of 
arms imports toward Third World debt (Table 4.4). For the constrained 
countries GNP and GIRB account for slightly over 50 percent of the 
fluctuatio
1
n in external debt However, adding imports, or TI (Equation 
3
1 
Table 4.4), to the regression equation causes reserves sign to change 
from positive to negative. So strong are total imports in contributin~ to 
this group's debt that GNP becomes insignificant in the regression 
equation. A similar result is obtained by including BI, the balance of 
payments (exports-imports), to the regression equation. 
Of importance for the present study is the high statistical 
significance of arms imports in contributing to the regression equation 
after controling for either imports (Equation 5, Table 4.4) or the 
balance of paymer.ts (Equation 6, Table 4.4). 
Apparently, these countries are constrained in the sense that they 
rely on public external borrowing as a major source of foreign 
exchange. The low growth in imports for this group as a whole 
suggests that foreign exchange may be rationed to one extent or 
another with governments not able to rely on taxes from exports to 
fund the bulk of their expenditures. In this environment, increased 
public external debt may be the only way to maintain or increase arms 
imports available to the governments. The high statistical significa.nce 
of imports in the debt regression is consistent with this interpretation, 
as is the low degree of significance of GNP in the regression equations. 
Unconstrained countries, however, show no statistically significant 
relationship (Equation 11, Table 4.4) between arms imports and 
external public debt 
"J"h., nnc:itivP c:ion nn thP h<1l<1nrP nf n~vme-nts mav indicate that_ in 
Ar~ Imports & Third World Debt 93 
general, this group of countries has not been reliant on public external 
debt for financing the bulk of their imports. On fact, the fast rate of 
growth of their imports-9.5 percent per annum over the 1970-1982 
period-may have been financed largely out of export earnings.) The 
relatively low debt-service ratios for this group of countries indicates 
that, in general, they are relatively resource unconstrained and that 
increased arms imports have in large part been funded out of 
expanded government revenues rather than external indebtedness. 
To sum up, the use of public external indebtedness to finance 
arms imports does not appear to be universal among developing 
countries. In fact, it is possible that a large group of relatively debt-free 
(debt as a percent of GDP) resource unconstrained countries has 
contained military expenditures within the limits imposed by self-
financing rather than risk jeopardizing overall creditworthiness. 
On the other hand, the bulk of debt accumulated by the resource-
constrained group of LDCs has stemmed from arms imports and, 
presumably, military expenditures. Apparently, the perceived need to 
expand defense expenditures by this group in regard to foreign 
exchange shortages has resulted in relatively high levels of external 
indebtedness, measured either as a percent of exports or imports for 
the group as a whole. 
It should be stressed that these results were obtained by regression 
arms imports in 1981 on the total outstanding public external debt as 
of 1982. Clearly, the accumulated debt in 1982 would be only partially 
affected by whatever component was accrued to finance arms imports 
in the previous year. 
Additional regressions were run, using the average level of military 
exports for the period 1972-1982 on the accumulated debt in 1982. The 
results of these regressions produced the same general picture as those 
presented above. These results are difficult to verify, however, since all 
the countries in the sample did not have observations for all the years 
under examination. 
Another test of the hypothesis that public external borrowing has 
played a significant role in financing Third World arms imports for a 
large group of Third World countries involves examining the actual 
determinants of arms imports. 
Logically, arms imports should be related to the overall level of 
military expenditures (ME) and/or the general level of central 
government expenditures (GEC). Whether a country is an arms 
producer7 should affect arms imports. For example, one might expect 
Third World countries capable of producing at least one major 
weapons system to have a different level of technical and industrial 
capabilities than countries without an indigenous arms industry. 
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Furthermore, the linkages between military expenditures and the 
economy, together with the import component of military equipment 
associated with a given level of military expenditures, should be 
considerably different for arms and nonarms producers. The ability of a 
Third World country to produce its own arms is dependent on the 
following components (Peleg, 1980): 
1. Financial resources 
2. Level of industrial development 
3. Scientific and educational potential 
4. Organizational and political abilities 
Limited economic and financial resources explain, at least partially, 
the difficulties of Third World countries in developing an independent 
weapons industry. The development Qf an arms industry, especially a 
totally independent one, requires very large amounts of financial 
resources. These are often beyond the abilities of most Third World 
states. It is well known that even some of the advanced industrial 
nations (such as Great Britain and France) have been compelled to 
cancel military production plans due to financial difficulties. 
In short, we might expect that countries with relatively abundant 
sources of foreign exchange and domestic savings capable of being 
appropriated by governments are likely to be the arms producers. 
In general, we would imagine the nonarms producers to be much 
more reliant on imports of military equipment to meet a given level of 
defense expenditures. Given the high cost of sophisticated imported 
arms, we would expect a high proportion of such expenditures to be 
financed by external debt (everything else being equal). 
To the extent that Third World countries produce their own 
weapons systems, we would expect a looser relationship to exist 
between arms imports and overall public external indebtedness (i.e., 
equipment can be obtained from local sources in addition to imports, 
with added domestic inputs occurring when the country's 
creditworthiness might be placed in jeopardy by additional external 
borrowing to finance arms acquisitions). 
Since data on the actual value of arms output in Third World 
countries is not available, the effect of arms production on arms 
imports was estimated by creating a dummy variable (PRODUCE), with 
values of 0 for the countries not having an indigenous arms industry 
and 1 for those possessing such an industry. The expected sign of this 
variable is negative in the regression equation; everything else being 
equal, indigenous arms production should reduce the need for 
imported arms. 
• -- ---- -- ! - _...._• - - _/! ..,,___ ----- -C ____ ; ____ :-..1: .... .- .. --... -..C ------!-
Arms Imports & Third World Debt 95 
performance, external debt, and structural composition of arms and 
nonarms produeers (Table 4.5), indicates that the arms producers can 
be characterized as possessing much higher levels of domestic savings, 
less export instability, superior export performance, higher external 
debt, but a much lower debt burden (as· a percentage of GDP) and 
higher capital inflows than the nonarms-producing countries. 
In fact, by using discriminant analysis, Looney and Frederiksen 
(1986b) indicated that a nearly perfect classification of Latin American 
arms producers and nonarms prodµcers could be made using only 
debt and import/export indicators as discriminating variables. That 
study also demonstrated that military and size variables were not 
capable of discriminating between arms producers and nonarms 
producers. Interestingly enough, debt and external variables and their 
relative magnitudes were nearly identical to those used to discriminate 
between the constrained and unconstrained countries above, with pro-
ducers in general profiling in a manner similar to constrained countries. 
In short, we should expect a much closer link to exist between 
constrained countries and arms imports and military expenditures than 
that existing for the unconstrained countries. 
Two control variables, arms imports in the previous year (AI80) 
and GNP, were also introduced into the regression equation. Each has 
an expected positive sign. 
The external financing variables chosen to reflect the external debt 
associated with the financing of arms imports was the World Bank's 
figure on external borrowing commitments contracted in 1981. As its 
name indicates, this figure represents the new external debt contracted 
the same year that arms deliveries were made. 
To summarize, arms imports (AI) are hypothesized to be a function 
of the following: 
(AI)= f (ME(+), PBCB(+), PRODUCE(-), GEC(+), AI80(+), GNP(+)) 
All the variables except arms imports in 1980 (AI80) are for the 
year 1981. The results obtained (see Table 4.6) support the general 
picture discussed above. In particular: 
1. Public borrowing commitments are positive and significant in 
affecting arms imports in the constrained countries, but not in 
the unconstrained countries. 
2. Indigenous arms production appears to reduce arms imports in 
the constrained countries, with perhaps a similar (but marginal) 
effect in the unconstrained countries. 
3. As anticipated, the link between military expenditures and arms 
imports is much stronger for the unconstrained group of 
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In general, therefore, it appears that a relatively large group of 
Third World countries has had a significant volume of arms imports 
financed by external credits, while a smaller but still significant group 
of Third World countries has, because· of a relative abundance of 
foreign exchange earnings, managed to finance arms imports without a 
significant resort to increased external indebtedness. 
Clearly, there are other subgroupings of developing countries that 
might just as logically have resorted to external financing of arms 
imports. A classification related to the constrained and unconstrained 
groups examined above would be the mineral-oil and nonmineral-oil 
exporters. Mineral-oil countries are classified as those LDCs having 
mineral and/or oil comprising at least 40 percent of their merchandise 
exports (see Nankani, 1979). Regressions with these subgroups (see 
Table 4. 7) provided similar, though not statistically significant, results as 
those obtained above for the constrain~d and unconstrained groups. 
Other possible subgroupings of developing countries include: (1) 
High income (over $1,000 per capita) and low income (under $1,000 
per capita); (2) Those countries with military governments (Sivard, 
1983), presumably more willing to borrow for increased arms imports; 
and (3) civilian regimes, presumably less willing to contract external 
debt for arms imports. None' of these subgroupings revealed 
statistically significant results (fable 4. 7). 
CONCUJSIONS 
The main question posed at the beginning of this chapter was whether 
or not arms imports have contributed to Third World public external 
debt In general, the results presented above indicate that the answer is 
no; however, for certain LDCs, it is likely that a high percentage of the 
external public debt accumulated by 1982 was the result of expanded 
arms imports in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
What is the best characterization of LDCs that have relied on 
public external indebtedness to finance arms imports? Based on the 
regression results, it appears that the resource-constrained LDCs best 
characterize Third World countries whose external public debt has 
been used in large part to fund increased military spending. This fact, 
together with the general "unproductive" nature of military 
expenditures, makes it unlikely that this group of countries as a whole 
will be in a position to significantly expand military expenditures. At 
best, these countries will be lucky to be able to service their existing 
public debt 
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NOTES 
1. The model is based on that developed by Heller and Frenkel (1982). 
2. Economic and debt variables were taken from the World Bank (1984a). 
Military expenditure data was taken from the U.S. Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency 0984). 
3. Government expenditures are taken from Sivard (1983). 
4. As can be inferred from the degrees of freedom, the results reported 
here are for smaller samples of countries than previously reported due to the 
elimination of countries with missing values. 
S. The complete results of the factor analysis can be obtained from the 
author upon request. 
6. See SAS Institute (1982) for a description of the program. The sample 
countries were initially assigned an arbitrary 1 or 0 so that placement could be 
made into two groups. A three-group division of countries did not produce a 
clear split between the means of the groups, i.e., there was not a high 
probability of correct placement for each country in one of these groups. 
7. For purposes of classification, military producers are defined as those 
countries currently producing at least one major weapons system (Neuman, 
1984). 
